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Abstract. Some cases show that counterfactual conditionals (‘counterfactuals’ for short) are
inherently ambiguous, equivocating between forward-tracking and backtracking counterfactu-
als. Elsewhere, I have proposed a causal modeling semantics, which takes this phenomenon
to be generated by two kinds of causal manipulations. (Lee 2015; Lee 2016) In an important
paper (Hiddleston 2005), Eric Hiddleston offers a different causal modeling semantics, which
he claims to be able to explain away the inherent ambiguity of counterfactuals. In this paper, I
discuss these two semantic treatments and argue that my (bifurcated) semantics is theoretically
more promising than Hiddleston’s (unified) semantics.
1 Introduction
Jim is standing at a high cliff. What would have happened if Jim were to jump
off the cliff? Naturally, there are two ways to counterfactualize the situation, and
they give rise to two individually intuitive yet jointly incompatible verdicts. On the
one hand, we may reason that Jim would have gotten killed by jumping off the cliff,
since he would not be able to survive crashing on the ground after falling from such
a high cliff. On the other hand, we may reason that Jim would not have gotten killed
by jumping off the cliff, since Jim is a rational person, who will not jump off a high
cliff unless there is, say, a safety net installed at the bottom. But if a safety net were
installed at the bottom, Jim certainly would not have gotten killed by jumping off
the cliff (he might even come out unhurt!). This shows that a counterfactual condi-
tional (or ‘counterfactual’ for short) is inherently ambiguous in the sense that the same
counterfactual, say, “If Jim were to jump off the cliff, he would have gotten killed” is
true under one mode of counterfactualization but false under the other (also see [4]).
Traditionally, these two modes of counterfactualization are regarded as resulting in
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two kinds of counterfactuals, namely, forward-tracking and backtracking counter-
factuals respectively. More precisely, the counterfactual “If Jim were to jump off the
cliff, he would have gotten killed” is said to be true interpreted as a forward-tracking
counterfactual, while false interpreted as a backtracking counterfactual.
The inherent ambiguity of counterfactuals, I have argued, is rooted in two dis-
tinct kinds of causal manipulation, which are responsible for the different ways of
counterfactualizing exhibited in the example above. ([5]) It is for this reason that I
have also suggested that the distinction between forward-tracking and backtracking
counterfactuals is better characterized by the causal modeling semantics of counter-
factuals.
In an important paper, Erick Hiddleston ([3]) has proposed a different causal
modeling semantics of counterfactuals, which is claimed to be able to account for
the inherent ambiguity of counterfactuals. Hiddleston’s semantics is starkly differ-
ent from the one I proposed before in that while my semantics appeals to distinct
treatments of two types of counterfactuals, Hiddleston’s semantics offers a unified
treatment. In this paper, I want to compare and contrast these two semantic treat-
ments. I argue that Hiddleston’s unified treatment, unlike my bifurcated treatment,
fails to capture the inherent ambiguity of counterfactuals.
In what follows, I will first introduce the causal modeling semantics I propose
in earlier papers. I will then examine Hiddleston’s semantics, and comparing his
semantics with mine. I then point out the difficulties faced by Hiddleston’s semantics.
2 Causal Modeling Semantics
Perhaps the best way to introduce the causal modeling semantics of counterfac-
tuals is to look at a concrete example. Let us then construct a causal model J for the
case mentioned at the beginning (I will call this case ‘Jump’).
A causal model is a mathematical entity aiming at representing the causal rela-
tions of the events in a scenario. More formally, a causal model M is a quadruple
hU; V; S;Ai. The first two elements, U and V , are sets of variables that are variables
for events constituting the scenario that the causal model is supposed to represent.
U is a finite set of variables fU1; : : : ; Ung called the exogenous variables, which are
supposed to be causally independent of all other factors in the model. V is a finite set
of variables fV1; : : : ; Vmg called the endogenous variables, which are supposed to
be causally dependent upon other factors in the model. The causal model J of Jump
naturally contains the following endogenous variables:
JUMP represents whether or not Jim jumps off the cliff.
KILL represents whether or not Jim gets killed.
J also naturally contains the following exogenous variables:
RATIONAL represents whether or not Jim is a rational person.
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NET represents whether or not a safety net is installed at the bottom of the cliff.
In general, each Vi 2 V and Ui 2 U admit a range of values, but it should be obvious
that J only contains binary variables that take on two possible values, i.e., “Yes” or
“No”.
It is customary to use ‘Vi = vi’ to stand for the proposition The variable Vi takes
on the value of vi. For binary variables such as JUMP;KILL;RATIONAL;NET, we
may use ‘1’ and ‘0’ to stand for Yes and No respectively (for simplicity’s sake, this
paper will only deal with binary variables). For instance, “JUMP = 1” means that
Jim jumps off the cliff, while “NET = 0” means that no safety net is installed at the
bottom of the cliff.
The third element of a causal model, S, is a set of structural equations that spec-
ify the causal-dependence relationships among variables. The causal dependence in
play may be deterministic and indeterministic, although I will focus solely on deter-
ministic causal relations here. For each Vi 2 V , S contains exactly one structural
equation of the following form:
Vi ( fi(PAi):
The meaning of ‘(’ is twofold. On the one hand, “X ( Y ” means thatX is causally
dependent on Y , i.e., whether X obtains or not is causally dependent on whether Y
obtains or not. On the other hand, “X ( Y ” indicates thatX will take on the value of
Y . Let ‘PAi’ stand for a subset of U [ V which is the set of Vi’s parents. Parenthood
is essentially a causal relation: the parents of an event are its direct causes, and its
children are its direct effects. The parents of a variable occur in the right-hand side of
its structural equation. For simplicity’s sake, we will also treat variables on the right-
hand side of the equation as propositions such that “Y ” means Y = 1, and “Y ”
means Y = 0.
J’s S naturally contains the following structural equations:
JUMP( (RATIONAL _ NET)
KILL( (JUMP ^ NET)
In words, “JUMP ( (RATIONAL _ NET)” means that whether or not Jim jumps
off the cliff depends causally on both whether or not Jim is a rational person and
whether or not a safety net is installed at the bottom such that Jim will jump off the
cliff if and only if either he is irrational or a safety net is installed at the bottom.
“KILL ( (JUMP ^ NET)” means that whether or not Jim gets killed is causally
dependent on both whether or not Jim jumps off the cliff and whether or not a safety
net is installed such that Jim will get killed if and only if he jumps off the cliff and
there is no safety net installed at the bottom.
There is no structural equation for exogenous variables such as RATIONAL and
NET. For exogenous variables are assumed to be causally independent of all other
82 Studies in Logic, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2017)
factors in the model. Their values are “given” in the model rather than determined by
the structural equations.
The fourth element of a causal model, A, is a function that assigns values to all
variables in the model. J’s A, arguably, is as follows:
A(RATIONAL) = 1
A(NET) = 0
A(JUMP) = 0
A(KILL) = 0:
In words, in Jump, Jim is a rational person, there is no safety net installed down the
cliff, Jim does not jump off the cliff, and he does not get killed.
With the notion of causal model at hand, we are in a position to introduce the
causal modeling semantics. At its core, the semantics takes the truth condition of
counterfactuals as:
(CM) “A > C” is true in a causal modelM iff “C” is true in certain submodelsM 0.
‘>’ stands for the counterfactual-conditional connective. Informally, a submodelM 0
is a causal model generated by causally manipulatingM in a certain way. The general
idea behind CM is this. Since a causal modelM represents a scenario s, a counter-
factual scenario s0, generated by causally manipulating the scenario s, is represented
by a submodelM 0 ofM , which is generated in turn by causally manipulatingM in a
parallel way.
I have argued, in previous works, that there are two types of submodels, which
give rise to the distinction between forward-tracking and backtracking counterfac-
tuals. ([4, 5]) The idea is that there are two distinct kinds of causal manipulation.
Roughly, one may manipulate a causal model either by changing the value of a vari-
able through breaking some structural equations or by changing the value of a variable
through tracing the required modifications back to some exogenous variables. Let us
call them intervention and extrapolation respectively.
Intervention has been featured in all prominent causal modeling semantics of
counterfactuals ([2, 6, 1]). LetM = hU; V; S;Ai be a causal model, B be a sentence
of the form ‘C1= c1^: : :^Cn= cn’, VB be the set of variables that are inB. An inter-
vention inM with respect toB generates a submodelM(B) = hU(B); V(B); S(B); A(B)i
ofM such that:
(i) U(B) = U [ VB.
(ii) V(B) = V n VB.
(iii) S(B) = S except that for each Ci 2 VB [ U(B), S(B)removes the structural
equation Ci ( fi(PAi) from S.
(iv) A(B) = A except that for each Ci 2 VB\U(B), A(B) sets the value of Ci to ci.
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To intervene in a causal modelM with respect toB is to remove the original structural
equations (if any) for Ci 2 VB and directly set the value to be ci. If Ci is exogenous,
intervention simply sets the value ofCi to be ci. The values of the rest of the variables
are calculated based on the value of Ci and S(B).
Extrapolation, by contrast, has received little attention from philosophers. Sup-
poseM = hU; V; S;Ai is a causal model, B a sentence of the form ‘C1= c1 ^ : : : ^
Cm= cm’, and VB the set of variables that are in B. Define VBc to be the closure of
the parents of the variables in VB, i.e., the set of the ‘ancestors’ of VB. That is to say,
define VBc to be the smallest set that satisfies the following conditions:
(i) For any X 2 VB, X 2 VBc.
(ii) For anyX and Y in U [ V , ifX 2 VBc and Y is a parent ofX (i.e., Y occurs
in the structural equation forX), then Y 2 VBc.
Now, let M = hU; V; S;Ai be a causal model and M a submodel of M generated
by extrapolatingM with respect to B, ifM satisfies the following conditions:
(i) U = U .
(ii) V  = V .
(iii) S = S.
(iv) A = A(X) for each X 2 U n VBc and A(Ci) = ci for each Ci in VB.
Like intervention, to extrapolate a causal modelM with respect to B also sets each
Ci in VB to take on the value ci. But unlike intervention, extrapolation preserves the
structural equations of the original model. More importantly, while intervention al-
ways gives us a unique submodel, extrapolation may generate multiple submodels.
When more than one submodel is generated, the context will determine which sub-
model or submodels are relevant in determining the truth values of counterfactuals.
Let us use M(B) to denote the contextually determined submodel or submodelsM,
which are generated by extrapolatingM with respect to B, and which play a crucial
role determines the truth value of the counterfactuals in play.
With intervention and extrapolation in hand, we may disambiguate CM into:
(CMIN) “A > C” is trueIN inM iff “C” is true inM(B).
(CMEX) “A > C” is trueEX inM iff “C” is true in allM 2M(B).
CMIN and CMEX give the correct verdicts with respect to Jump. Intervening in J with
respect to (JUMP = 1) gives rise to the submodel J(JUMP=1) such that J(JUMP=1)’s
U(JUMP=1) and V(JUMP=1) are identical to J’s. J(JUMP=1)’s S(JUMP=1), by contrast,
consists of the following:
KILL( (JUMP ^ NET)
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As a result, J(JUMP=1)’s A(JUMP=1) is that:
A(JUMP=1)(RATIONAL) = 1
A(JUMP=1)(NET) = 0
A(JUMP=1)(JUMP) = 1
A(JUMP=1)(KILL) = 1:
On CMIN, since “KILL = 1” is true in J(JUMP=1), “JUMP = 1 > KILL = 1” is
trueIN in J , as desired.
By contrast, suppose that we extrapolate J with respect to (JUMP = 1). In the
present context, extrapolation arguably generates a unique submodel J (JUMP=1) 2
J(JUMP=1), whose value assignment A(JUMP=1) is as follows:
A(JUMP=1)(RATIONAL) = 1
A(JUMP=1)(NET) = 1
A(JUMP=1)(JUMP) = 1
A(JUMP=1)(KILL) = 0:
On CMEX, since “KILL = 1” is false in J (JUMP=1), “JUMP = 1 > KILL = 1” is
falseEX in J , as desired.
Not only does the distinction between intervention and extrapolation give the
correct verdicts, it also sheds an important light on the two modes of counterfac-
tualization that give rise to forward-tracking and backtracking counterfactuals. Let
‘Jump’ and ‘Kill’ stand for the propositions Jim jumps off the cliff and Jim has gotten
killed respectively. When counterfactualizing that “Jump > Kill” is true in Jump, we
focus solely on the causal effect of the event of Jim jumping off the cliff (i.e., Jump)
itself. The causal relations between Jump and its causes are ignored. In particular,
we make no attempt to actualize or rationalize how Jump could have happened in
Jump in the first place. For instance, we ignore the facts that Jim is a rational person
and that no safety net is installed, which in the actual situation have prevented Jim
from jumping off the cliff. In a sense, we simply stipulate that Jim jumps off the cliff
without having in our mind a specific story as to how Jump could have happened in
the first place. This mode of counterfactualization is nicely captured by intervention,
for intervening in a causal modelM with respect to (Ci = ci) generates a submodel
M(Ci=ci) that contains information necessary for understanding the causal effect of
(Ci = ci). ([2])M(Ci=ci) surgically removes the causal influence Ci’s parents have
on Ci, while stipulating Ci to take on the value ci. This allows us to see clearly the
causal effect that (Ci = ci) has on Ci’s children.
On the other hand, when counterfactualizing that “Jump > Kill” is false in Jump,
our focus is on the causal relations among Jump and its causes in order to determine
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under what condition Jump could have actually happened. For instance, we reason
that Jim would not get killed if he was to jump off the cliff, since Jim was a rational
person, and a rational person would not jump off the cliff without the installation of a
safety net at the bottom, but if a safety net was installed, jumping off the cliff would
then not get him killed. This mode of counterfactualization is captured nicely by
extrapolation, as extrapolating a causal modelM with respect to (Ci = ci) generates
a set of submodels M that contains all information necessary for knowing under
what condition (Ci = ci) could have actually happened inM . M assigns the values
of its variables in a way that preserves all the causal relations among its variables in
M , which gives us a story of what else needs to change in order for Ci to take on the
value ci inM .
3 Hiddleston’s Causal Modeling Semantics
In [3], Eric Hiddleston proposes a different causal modeling semantics of coun-
terfactuals which is in stark contrast to the one introduced above. Specifically, Hid-
dleston’s semantics offers a unified account of forward-tracking and backtracking
counterfactuals. In what follows, I first will introduce Hiddleston’s semantics, point-
ing out the similarities and differences between Hiddleston’s semantics and the one
mentioned above (or the orthodox causal modeling semantics in general). I then ar-
gue that Hiddleston’s semantics fails to account for the distinction between forward-
tracking and backtracking semantics. Rather, closely examining what goes wrong in
Hiddleston’s semantics further vindicates the assumption that forward-tracking coun-
terfactuals and backtracking counterfactuals are of two different kinds.
A distinctive feature of Hiddleston’s semantics is that it allows indeterministic
laws. More precisely, Hiddleston takes structural equations to be specified as follows:
(H) ((A1 = a1 ^ : : : ^An = an)  Pr(C = c) = x).
‘’ and ‘Pr’ stand for material implication and the probability function respectively.
Hiddleston restricts Ai to what he calls the positive parents of C in M . Positive
parenthood characterizes the variables which have a direct positive influence on C =
c. The latter is defined as follows:
For each Ai, Ai has a direct positive influence on C = c iff Pr(C = cjAi =
ai ^ Zi = zi) > Pr(C = cjAi 6= ai ^ Zi = zi) (where Zi stands for C’s other
parents).
We now define a kind of submodelM 0 ofM which Hiddleston calls “-minimal
model’. To get to it, we need to introduce some terminologies.
As noted, a submodel M 0 of M is a causal model resulted from causally ma-
nipulatingM in some specific manners (M 0 andM would thus have the same set of
variables V and U ). A -model is a causal model in which “” is true.
Let ‘PPAC,M’ stand for the set of C’s positive parents inM such that PPAC,M =
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fAi : Ai = ai has a direct positive influence on C = c inMg. When no confusion
arises, we may drop the subscript ofM .
A causal break is a variable, whose value in a submodelM 0 is different from its
value inM while all its positive parents have the same values inM 0 as inM . More
precisely, a causal break in a submodelM 0 relative toM is a variable A such that the
value of A inM 0 is different from the value of A inM , and for eachXi 2 PPAA, the
value of Xi remains constant across M 0 and M . Let ‘Break(M 0;M)’ be the set of
variables Ai such that Ai is a causal break inM 0 relative toM . When no confusion
arises, we may simply write ‘Break’.
A causal intact is a variable, whose value in a submodelM 0 is the same as the
one in M and all its positive parents have the same values in M 0 as in M . More
precisely, a causal intact in a submodelM 0 relative toM is a variable A such that the
value of As remains constant acrossM 0 andM , and for each Xi 2 PAAA, the value
ofXi remains constant acrossM 0 andM . Let ‘Intact(M 0;M)’ be the set of variables
Ai such that Ai is a causal intact inM 0 relative toM . When no confusion arises, we
may simply write ‘Intact’.
Now, we are in a position to define a -minimal model M 0 which is crucial to
Hiddleston’s account. LetM = hV;U; S;Ai be a causal model, A submodelM 0 of
M and Break(M 0;M) are -minimal relative toM iff
(i) M 0 is a -model,
(ii) For each variable X which is not a descendant of , Intact(M 0;M) \ fXg is
maximal among -models, and,
(iii) Break(M 0;M) is minimal among -models.
Hiddleston’s causal modeling characterization of the truth condition of counterfactu-
als is as follows:
(CMH) “A > C” is true in a model M and a context C iff “C” is true in every
A-minimal modelM 0 for which Break(M 0;M) is relevant in C.
Notice that CMH relates the truth-values of counterfactuals to contexts. The reason
is that there may be multiple (yet incompatible) A-minimal modelsM 0, and only the
relevant A-minimal model is pertaining to the characterization of the truth condition
of “A > C”, while whether a A-minimal model is relevant is determined by context.
When no confusion arises, we will drop the specification of the context.
Before we go on to discuss Hiddleston’s treatment of forward-tracking and back-
tracking counterfactuals, let us pause and make some comments. First, a distinctive
feature of Hiddleston’s semantics is that it allows structural equations to be speci-
fied by a probabilistic function, i.e., (H). Hiddleston’s idea is that (H) embodies a
quasi-deterministic view on causal dependence: an event A is causally dependent
on an event B even if B only renders A more probable rather than certain. Hid-
dleston justifies (H) by pointing out that “many processes such as coin flips and die
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rolls behave as if they were indeterministic, and so we treat them as such”. “This
quasi-determinism,” Hiddleston contends, “may be due to either determinism or in-
determinism at the fundamental level, and commonsense is not committed to either
way”. ([3], p. 639)
Nevertheless, Hiddleston’s quasi-deterministic structural equations can account
for the orthodox deterministic structural equations that take the form Vi ( fi(PAi).
For notice that the following is a special case of (H):
(HD) ((A1 = a1 ^ : : : ^An = an)  Pr(C = c) = 1).
Now, we may further reformulate (HD) into:
(HD)0 C ( fi(A1 = a1 ^ : : : ^An = an).
Fi is a certain (causal) function that maps (A1 = a1^ : : :^An = an) to c. That (HD)
and (HD)0 are basically the same is warranted by strict implication.
It is an interesting question whether we should adopt quasi-deterministic struc-
tural equations as Hiddleston does or deterministic structural equations as the ortho-
dox causal modeling semanticists do. While I agree with Hiddleston that common-
sense is not committed to either determinism or indeterminism, it is not obvious to
me that quasi-deterministic causal dependence is ubiquitous in our understanding of
daily situations. The reason is that our understanding of a situation often consists
in grasping the circumstantial necessity, i.e., what is inevitable in the circumstance,
among events. For instance, in Jump, it is true that, strictly, Jim may not even get hurt
jumping off a high cliff. So Jim getting killed is only quasi-deterministically depends
on Jim jumping off the cliff. Yet it is common that we idealize the situation so that Jim
getting killed is circumstantially inevitable given that he jumps off the cliff. Such ide-
alization is understandable and even mandatory, for otherwise many situations would
not be graspable. Hiddleston is surely right that processes such as coin flips and die
rolls are characteristically quasi-deterministic. The orthodox causal modeling seman-
ticists, however, can always handle such processes by regarding them as exogenous
variables.
Undoubtedly, a lot more can and should be said regarding this issue. Pursuing
the issue any further, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. Fortunately, the
point I want to make will not be affected by our choice of the general form of struc-
tural equations. For a deterministic structural equation can be regarded as a special
case of the quasi-deterministic form of structural equations, and my argument can be
manifested by using only the deterministic structural equations.
Second, suppose that a causal modelM contains only structural equations of the
form (HD)0. It follows that a Break related toM can only be an exogenous variable.
For it is impossible for an endogenous variable to take a different value while its par-
ent’s value remains intact, given that the structural equation in play is of determinism.
Moreover, with respect to such a model, a set of A-minimal models is identical to a
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certain set of submodelsM(A). For it seems obvious that an appropriate specification
will allow an extrapolation ofM with respect to A to satisfy the three conditions of
A-minimal model mentioned above. In other words, CMH can be characterized by
CMEX, when only deterministic structural equations (i.e., (HD)0) are involved.
4 Hiddleston on Forward-Tracking and Backtracking Counterfactuals
Hiddleston does not take counterfactuals to be inherently ambiguous in the sense
defined above. Rather he takes the distinction between forward-tracking and back-
tracking counterfactuals to be manifested by a certain context-dependent feature of
counterfactuals. As noted, CMH takes the truth condition of “A > C” to be relative
to a certain Break determined by a certain context. Such a context-dependence of
the truth condition of counterfactuals, on Hiddleston’s view, results in the distinction
between forward-tracking and backtracking counterfactuals. Let me elaborate.
Arguably, Hiddleston will accept J as “a natural model” for Jump. ([3], p. 645)
Firstly, that J contains RATIONAL;NET; JUMP;KILL seems both natural and intu-
itive. Secondly, it should be uncontroversial that J’s S consist of:
JUMP( (RATIONAL _ NET)
KILL( (JUMP ^ NET):
For one thing, we have seen that (H) can be construed as (HD)0, when only determin-
istic structural equations are involved. For another, Hiddleston also notes that in such
a case, “Jim jumps only if either NET = 1 or RATIONAL = 0” ([3], p. 645; I have
modified Hiddleston’s remarks to be in line with the present terminology). Thirdly,
J’s value assignment A is also as innocuous as it can be, reflecting the fact that Jim
is a rational person, who does not jump off a high cliff without a safety net installed
at the bottom. Hiddleston has accepted A. ([3], p. 645)
I have claimed that “If Jim were to jump off the cliff, he would have gotten
killed” (or “JUMP = 1 > KILL = 1”) is true when construed as a forward-tracking
counterfactual but false when construed as a backtracking counterfactual. As I see it,
Hiddleston also agrees with this claim. However, Hiddleston does not think that the
difference between these two kinds of counterfactuals consists in two different kinds
of causal manipulations. The difference, rather, is considered as the product of the
context-sensitivity of the relevant Break. ([3], pp. 645–646) On Hiddleston’s view,
“JUMP = 1 > KILL = 1” is true when fRATIONALg is taken as the relevant Break,
whereas it will become false when fNETg is taken as the relevant Break instead. More
precisely, when fRATIONALg is taken to be the relevant Break, the only JUMP = 1-
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minimal model J’ is such that J 0’s A’ is as follows:
A0(RATIONAL) = 0
A0(NET) = 0
A0(JUMP) = 1
A0(KILL) = 1:
By contrast, when fNETg is regarded as the relevant Break, the only JUMP = 1-
minimal model J 00’s A00 is as follows:
A00(RATIONAL) = 1
A00(NET) = 1
A00(JUMP) = 1
A00(KILL) = 0:
CMH gives verdicts that are in accordance with our initial intuitions. On the one
hand, since “KILL = 1” is true in J 0 which is the only JUMP = 1-minimal model
for which Break(J; J 0) (i.e., fRATIONALg) is relevant, “JUMP = 1 > KILL = 1”
is true in J , as desired. On the other hand, since “KILL = 1” is false in J 00, which is
the only JUMP = 1-minimal model for which Break(J; J 00) (i.e., fNETg) is relevant,
“JUMP = 1 > KILL = 1” is false in J , as desired. The variation of the truth-value
of “JUMP = 1 > KILL = 1” is regarded as the product of the context-sensitivity of
Break.
Which one should we choose, a unified treatment such as CMH, or a bifurcated
one such as CMIN and CMEX? The key to this question is intervention. It is not hard
to recognize that Hiddleston’s semantics in general leaves no room for intervention.
For allA-minimal modelsM 0 ofM preserve the set of structural equations ofM , and
without the violation of certain structural equations, intervention is impossible. This
suggests a natural way to test Hiddleston’s treatment of the ambiguity of counterfac-
tuals. That is, in order for CMH to hold, or at least be theoretically no less promising
than CMIN and CMEX, it must be that the distinction between forward-tracking and
backtracking counterfactuals can always be explained or predicted by the context-
sensitivity of Break. But this last point is problematic. One way to see this is to note
that, related to causal models containing only structural equations of the form (HD)0
and binary variables, the context-sensitivity-of-Break maneuver is feasible only when
there are more than one exogenous variables, otherwise there will only be at most one
A-minimal modelM 0 ofM . In other words, such a causal model will only have ex-
actly one Break, i.e., the only exogenous variable, and, as a result, the truth-values of
counterfactuals with respect to such amodel could not be context-sensitive. The prob-
lem is that the distinction between forward-tracking and backtracking counterfactuals
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persists even in causal models with exactly one exogenous variable. For instance, sup-
pose that we modified Jump such that either a powerful demon will install a safety
net at the bottom or she will cause Jim to become a rational person (call this case
‘Jump’). Naturally, a causal model J for Jump contains exactly one exogenous
variable:
DEMON represents whether the demon installs a safety net at the bottom of the
cliff or she causes Jim to become a rational person.
By contrast, J’s endogenous variables includeNET;RATIONAL; JUMP;KILL. The
detail of J needs not bother us here. What is important is while J does not allow
for more than one JUMP = 1-minimal model. But it seems that the distinction be-
tween construing “JUMP = 1 > KILL = 1” as a forward-tracking counterfactual
and construing it as a backtracking counterfactual is still perfectly sensible in Jump.
Specifically, it seems that “JUMP = 1 > KILL = 1” still appears to be true (false)
when construed as a forward-tracking (backtracking) counterfactual in Jump.
While it is not hard to see that CMIN and CMEX can give the desired verdicts
for the truth-values of “JUMP = 1 > KILL = 1” in Jump, the same cannot be said
of CMH. For models that contain exactly one exogenous variable like J, CMH will
unduly predict either that the distinction between forward-tracking and backtracking
counterfactuals does not arise, or that these two kinds of counterfactuals collapse.
Neither option seems plausible. This shows not only that CMH is not in a position
to account for the inherent ambiguity of counterfactuals, but also that a bifurcated
treatment along the line of CMIN and CMEX is on the right track.
The problem is further manifested by cases where intervention and extrapolation
come apart. In the extreme cases, there can be intervention even if no extrapolation
is possible. To illustrate, consider the following case:
Nuclear. A nuclear missile will be launched if two separate passcodes are
keyed into the launching machine. If the missile launches, a major city
will be destroyed. The captain is the only person who knows both pass-
codes. If he decides to launch the missile, then he will have to give each
of his two assistants, John and Jason, a separate passcode, and they will
then key it into the launching machine. The captain has no intention to
destroy any city. To make sure that the missile will not be launched, the
captain hypnotizes himself such that he will be psychologically impos-
sible to give both John and Jason a passcode. However, the laws require
that the captain have to tell at least one of his assistants one of the two
passcodes. The captain tells John the passcode.
Let us construct a causal modelN for Nuclear. N ’s U naturally contains one exoge-
nous variable:
CAPTAIN represents whether the captain gives a passcode to John or to Jason.
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Also, we stipulate that CAPTAIN takes on the value 1 when the captain decides to
give a passcode to John, otherwise the value 0.
N ’s V , by contrast, consists of four endogenous variables:
JOHN represents whether or not John keys a passcode into the launching ma-
chine.
JASON represents whether or not Jason keys a passcode into the launching
machine.
LAUNCH represents whether or not the nuclear missile is launched.
DESTROY represents whether or not a major city is destroyed.
The following are the structural equations in N ’s S:
JOHN( CAPTAIN
JASON( CAPTAIN
LAUNCH( (JOHN ^ JASON)
DESTROY( LAUNCH:
In words, whether John (Jason) keys in the passcode depends causally on whether or
not the captain tells him the passcode such that John (Jason) will key in the passcode
if and only if the captain tells him the passcode. Moreover, whether or not the nuclear
missile will launch depends causally on whether or not John and Jason key in the
passcode such that the missile will launch if and only if both John and Jason key in
the passcode. Finally, whether or not a major city will be destroyed depends causally
on whether or not the nuclear missile launches such that the city will be destroyed if
and only if the missile launches.
Naturally, N ’s A is as follows:
A(CAPTAIN) = 1
A(JOHN) = 1
A(JASON) = 0
A(LAUNCH) = 0
A(DESTROY) = 0:
In words, the captain tells John the passcode, John keys in the passcode, Jason does
not key in the passcode, the nuclear missile does not launch, and a major city is not
destroyed.
N shows that intervention and extrapolation cannot be the same. More precisely,
while there is a solution when intervening in N with respect to (LAUNCH = 1),
there is no solution when extrapolating N with respect to (LAUNCH = 1). That is,
intervening inN with respect to (LAUNCH = 1) generates a submodelN(LAUNCH=1)
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whose set of structural equations S(LAUNCH=1) consists of:
JOHN( CAPTAIN
JASON( CAPTAIN
DESTROY( LAUNCH:
Moreover, A(LAUNCH=1) is as follows:
A(CAPTAIN) = 1
A(JOHN) = 1
A(JASON) = 0
A(LAUNCH) = 1
A(DESTROY) = 1:
By contrast, extrapolatingH with respect to (LAUNCH = 1) generates no consistent
submodelN at all. Suppose that we extrapolateN with respect to (LAUNCH = 1).
By LAUNCH( (JOHN^ JASON), it follows that JASON should take on the value
1. But then CAPTAIN will have to take on the value 0 (by JASON( CAPTAIN).
But if CAPTAIN is to take on the value 0, JOHN also will take on the value 0 (by
JOHN ( CAPTAIN). But if JOHN is to take on the value 0, LAUNCH will have
to take on the value 0, too (by LAUNCH ( (JOHN ^ JASON)). Contradiction. In
other words, extrapolation N with respect to (LAUNCH = 1) will have no solution.
Since CMH can be characterized by CMEX related to causal models like N , it
is not surprising that the former, too, is not able to handle the same problem. Notice
that in N , the only relevant break is fCAPTAINg. But if so, then there exists no
LAUNCH = 1-minimal model N 0 for which fCAPTAINg is relevant. LAUNCH
to take on the value 1 is impossible in the sense that it requires breaking structural
equations. This indicates the root of this problem: since both CMH and CMEX do not
allow violations of structural equations, some value assignments may thus turn out
impossible.
This is problematic if CMH is supposed to account for forward-tracking coun-
terfactuals. In particular, the following (forward-tracking counterfactual) seems intu-
itively true in Nuclear:
(1) If the nuclear missile had been launched, a major city would have been de-
stroyed.
(1) causes no problem formy semantics, for “DESTROY=1” is trueIN inN(LAUNCH=1)
as desired. But the same could not be said of CMH, as we can see that it is impossible
for LAUNCH to take on value 1 for doing so requires violations of structural equa-
tions. Hiddleston, in a footnote, suggests taking such counterfactuals to be vacuously
true. ([3], p. 655, footnote 7) So perhaps we can regard (1) as vacuously true. But this
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move is implausible, for the following (forward-tracking counterfactual) would also
be counted as vacuously true:
(2) If the nuclear missile had been launched, a major city would still not have been
destroyed.
Since (2) is intuitively false, Hiddleston’s suggestion is implausible.
5 Conclusion
If what have been said is correct, Hiddleston’s causal modeling semantics cannot
cope with the inherent ambiguity of counterfactuals. While such ambiguity might
sometimes be predicted by the context-sensitivity of the relevant Breaks in CMH, it
is mistaken to diagnose the root of this phenomenon as consisting in such context-
sensitivity. Elaborating the failure of CMH in fact shows clearly that a bifurcated
semantics such as CMIN and CMEX is required in order to account for explaining the
inherent ambiguity of counterfactuals. Hence, contra Hiddleston, intervention and
extrapolation are the key to the distinction between forward-tracking and backtracking
counterfactuals.
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摘 要
某些案例显示反事实条件句（counterfactual conditionals）是有“内在歧义
的”（inherently ambiguous），即同一句反事实条件句既可以表达“前进式反事实条
件句”（forward-tracking counterfactuals）也可以表达“回溯式反事实条件句”（back-
tracking counterfactuals）。在之前的文章中（Lee 2015，Lee 2016），我提出一个因
果模型反事实条件句语义学（causal modeling semantics of counterfactuals），主张
反事实条件句的内在歧义性是由不同的因果操弄（causal manipulation）所产生的。
在一篇很重要的论文中（Hiddleston 2005），Eric Hiddleston提出一个截然不同的
因果模型反事实条件句语义学，并宣称这个语义学可以解释反事实条件句的内在
歧义性。本文将介绍上述两个因果模型反事实条件句语义学，并试图论证本人的
语义学比 Hiddleston的语义学能够更好地处理反事实条件句的内在歧义性。
